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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated the duty of States to prosecute international crimes and the 
question of amnesty, with a focus on Africa as a case study. The study focuses 
specifically on the controversial question of granting amnesty to perpetrators of 
international crimes. Principally, international law both customary and conventional, 
imposes on states the duty to prosecute and punish international crimes while 
amnesty does not bar the prosecution of persons responsible for international crimes. 
The obligation to prosecute accused persons and punish those found guilty for 
international crimes arise from International Conventions to which a state is  party. 
These include the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols, the 
Conventions on the Crime of Genocide and Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel. Others are the Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, The Rome 
Statute of the ICC and Human Rights Conventions like International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights. States' obligation to prosecute and punish those 
responsible for committing certain violations establishes a minimal requirement of 
accountability from the idea that prosecution tied to punishment is the best method in 
all circumstances for achieving the legitimate goals of a criminal justice system. On 
the other side of restorative justice, only those amnesty laws which are promulgated 
for the purpose of ending or preventing a war or a protracted period of serious 
violence or otherwise to facilitate social transition and reconciliation and not those 
granted in order merely to shield former leaders from criminal liability have been 
considered as legitimate. It is now apt to conclude that amnesty cannot prevail over 
prosecution particularly where international crimes are involved.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Problem 
Once a crime has been identified as having a peremptory norm (jus cogens) status, it 
inevitably imposes obligation of a state towards the international community as a 
whole (erga omnes), or obligation owed to all mankind. These obligations include 
the duty to prosecute accused perpetrators and to punish those found guilty. A jus 
cogens norm is a rule which cannot be set aside by a treaty or acquiescence by State 
but only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule with contrary effect
1
. As 
example of  jus cogens Ian Brownlie lists the prohibition of the use of force, the law 
of genocide, the principle of racial non-discrimination, crimes against humanity, and 
the rules prohibiting the trade in slaves and piracy
2
. And, obligation erga omnes 
amounts to 'the obligations of a State towards the international community as whole', 
as explained by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
3
 The ICJ proclaimed as 
follows:  
“By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligation erga omnes,"
4
 
 
However, on the other side, from the time immemorial amnesty has been employed 
as a means of promoting political settlement and advancing reconciliation in 
societies that have emerged from repression. Most national courts; which have 
                                                 
1
 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 
2
 Ian Brownlie, Principles oj Public International Law s" ed. (Clarendon Press, 1998), p.515 
3
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 ICJ Reports, p.32. 
4
  Ibid 
  
2 
adjudicated the validity of their own amnesty laws have found them to be valid; The 
countries include Argentina (1970s), Chile (1980s), South Africa (1995), Sierra 
Leone (1996), and Uganda (2010), to mention a few. Amnesty is therefore a 
sovereign act of forgiveness or general oblivion for past offences, often granted 
before a trial or conviction by a head of state, an executive or a legislative body, to a 
large group of persons guilty of specific conduct or crimes.  
 
The emergence of an international system of prosecution for international crimes 
dates back from the World War One (WWI) and gained its momentum during the 
World War Two (WWII) with the establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) and Tokyo Tribunals, followed by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) 1994, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 2002. Despite 
these efforts, the reasons for offering amnesties have not diminished and some states 
in the midst of violence have continued to rely on promises of non-prosecution as a 
means to bring all parties to a conflict to the negotiating table or begin a process of 
demobilization, reintegration or reconciliation.  
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone is the only international criminal court which 
has directly faced the question of amnesty to date, as it was held in Prosecutor v 
Kallon et al, in 2004 that the Lome Amnesty had no effect vis-a-vis its jurisdiction. 
Likewise, there is no provision which recognises amnesty under the ICTY and the 
ICTR Tribunals as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). This study will examine the duty to prosecute international crimes on the one 
hand, and granting of amnesty on the other. In particular, the study aims to examine 
  
3 
the reasons behind the conflict existing between Prosecution and Amnesty, in an 
attempt to propose the best practices.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
There are conflicting views on the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international 
crimes and the duty to recognize and grant amnesty. For instance, Article 
6(5) of the Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 
requires parties to the conflict to negotiate peace treaty to end hostilities. This 
means that amnesty can be granted even for international crimes as recently 
applied in Uganda 2010 in the Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni vs Uganda, 
Constitutional Petition No. 036/11, arising out of  HCT/OO/1CD/Case No. 
02/10, Twinomujuni, Byamugisha, Nshimye, Arach-Amoko and Kasule, JJA 
(Constitutional Court of Uganda), 22 September 201l.  
 
Equally, laws at national levels also allow for amnesty to be granted to persons who 
may commit international crimes, as the cases in Zimbabwe, South Africa and 
Uganda from Africa and Latin American countries including Argentina, Chile etc. 
However, this seems to be contrary to certain international law standards imposing 
obligations on states to prosecute international crimes. For instance, Article 10 of 
the Statute of the SCSL does not allow amnesty.  
 
In this regard, states has resulted into practicing amnesty consequently brought about 
conflicting views on the two mechanisms to justice in one hand, while in the 
other states continues to practice amnesty to international crimes as contrary 
an obligation which needs states to prosecute. Indeed, even in those situations 
  
4 
whereby amnesty has been applied as a mechanism to justice still it has faced 
challenges in the courts of law. For instance, in the Azania People's 
Organisation  vs the President of the Republic of South Africa, et ol, Case No 
CCT17/96, paras 1- 66 (AZAPO Case) 
 
In South Africa as well as in Argentina amnesty was challenged in court based on 
the constitutionality grounds. In short, in most if not all places in which amnesty has 
been applied it has still been followed by prosecution as a doubt rose by victims of 
international crimes.  
 
In this standpoint, the study aims to examine the contexts in which the controversy 
between prosecution and amnesty emerge with a view to proposing the best 
alternative which can offer justice and also do away with the conflicting views.  
 
1.3 Research Questions  
This investigation will be guided by two questions corresponding to the specific 
tasks identified in 1.3 above as follows:  
i) Should amnesty prevail over the duty to prosecute perpetrators of 
international crimes?  
ii) What is the practice of national and international courts on the status of 
amnesty granted to persons responsible for international crimes?  
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study  
1.4.1 General Objective  
The main objective of this study is to examine the context in which prosecution and 
amnesty as mechanisms to justice are applicable to international crimes.  
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1.4.2 Specific Objectives  
Specifically, the study seeks to:  
i) To study the jurisprudence of international and national courts on the question 
of amnesty in the context of international crimes.  
ii) To examine the duty imposed on States in prosecuting of international crimes 
by analysing customary international law and international law duty to repress 
such crimes as found in various treaties.  
iii) To examine international legal basis for amnesty.  
 
1.5 Research Methods  
This research is deskwork as it largely draws from the review of research existing in 
this field based on Statutes, International Conventions, Cases and academic 
publications. Moreover, in-depth information was also drawn from interviews and 
informal discussions with experts and victims of international crimes. Similarly, a 
questionnaire was used to collect information from relevant institutions, including 
the ICTR and the High Court of Tanzania, Civil society organizations (Legal and 
Human Rights Centre, Amnesty International (Tanzania Chapter), International 
Committee of the Red Cross and individual experts in the fields of international law 
and human rights.  
 
Purposeful and stratified sampling techniques were used to draw individuals from 
the relevant positions and status to ensure representativeness. The number of 
individuals in each category depended on the sampling frame for individual 
categories as well as the sample size required for the study, which ranged between 
  
6 
25 and 30. Data was analysed descriptively in relation to the specific objectives 
while statistical procedures was used to establish frequencies and percentages 
relative to responses.  
 
1.6 Significance of the Study  
This study is significant in a number of ways; first, it provides knowledge and 
understanding to the general public on the mechanisms in offering justice to the 
victims of international crimes. Under this respect, this study found .out the 
procedures and contexts in which prosecution and amnesty are effected. This is 
important in incorporating international treaties and agreements particularly in 
Africa and to explore the factors that have caused states to domesticate certain 
international treaties and agreements in its municipal law while refusing to 
domesticate others. For example, Tanzania till to-date has not domesticated the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in its municipal law, although the 
country has ratified the treaty.  
 
In this respect, ideally it exposes the duty of a State to fulfill its obligation of 
prosecuting perpetrators of international crimes specifically when other mechanisms 
are inefficient to bring justice to victims. For example, when a matter arises, it is the 
duty of the state to prosecute the perpetrators in a competent national court or 
extradite perpetrators of international crimes to another state for trial. Second, this 
study also highlights the importance of putting in place a mechanism which makes 
justice to be attained properly to victims of international crimes through prosecution 
and amnesty that ought to be fairly applied at international, regional and national 
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levels. Lastly, this study enables the general public to know about treaties ratified by 
states which to- date remain unincorporated and take the necessary measures to 
make sure that, those treaties are incorporated, so that the general public, especially 
the ordinary individuals can participate in scrutiny on how their state fulfill the duty 
to deal with international crimes.  
 
1.7 Hypothesis of the Study  
The main assumption of this study is that, Prosecution is the better mechanism to 
offer justice to the victims of international crimes than amnesty based on the 
experience where the two mechanisms have been used, particularly in Uganda, 
South Africa and the Amnesty decision by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This 
is because wherever amnesty has been applied, it still needs to be complemented by 
prosecution for justice to the victims. Further, this assumption is premised on 
customary international law and treaties imposing express obligations on states to 
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes.  
 
1.8 Literature Review  
Obura 
5
states that, “the reality presented by States practices on granting of amnesties 
has made some scholars question the existence of the erga omnes duty to prosecute 
and punish international crimes." However, he further argues that, the granting of 
amnesties by state cannot negate the existence of this duty which exists both in 
treaty and customary law
6
. Both treaty and customary obligations to punish 
                                                 
5
 Ken Obura 'The Duty to Prosecute International Crimes Under InternationalLaw' in Chacha 
Murungu and Japhet Begon,Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa(2011) pll. 
6
 C. Edelenbos 'Human Rights Violatibns:A Duty to·Prosecute'(1994)7Leiden Journal of 
International Law 5 21. 
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atrocious crimes recognize this and are consistent with a limited program of 
prosecution, but would be breached by wholesale impunity
7
.  
 
However, many scholars have argued that, where the substantive right is non-
derogable, it carries attendant remedial obligations that are equally non-derogable
8
. 
Similarly, some national courts, as in the case of  the courts of  Uganda ( in Kwoye/o 
case), South Africa
9
" and EI Salvador
10
, express the view that the international law 
not only fails to prohibit amnesty but also encourages it
11
. These courts cite article 
6(5) of Additional Protocol II of 1977 which encourages amnesty by providing that 
at the end of hostilities in internal conflicts the authorities shall endeavour to grant 
the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the conflict
12
. 
This is unsettled position which this study will try to find the truth about.  
 
Like, the IMT, IMTFE, ICTY, ICTR and the SCSL; the ICC Rome Statute similarly 
lacks any provision on amnesties, despite the issue being on the agenda of the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference and having been considered in the travaux pre 'paratoires 
(drafting history of the treaty), leaving the text in a state of 'creative ambiguity’.13 
This is a controversy which this study will try to highlight the possible contexts 
underlying the problem and come up with a reasoned conclusion on how and why 
prosecution or amnesty is a better mechanism to offer justice.  
                                                 
7
 ibid 
8
 Ken Obura 'Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa'(2011) p29. 
9
 Azania Peoples Organization(AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996(4) SA 
671(CC)691 para32 
10
 Proceedings 10-93 (May 20, 1993); reprinted in NJ Kritz (ed) Transitional Justice (1995) 549 -555.  
11
 op cit, Ken Obura, p.30. 
12
 Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions. 
13
 Yasmin Q. Naqvi 'Impediments to Exercising Jurisdiction over Internatianal Crimes' (2010) p 86.  
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On the other hand, some commentators like Sherrif Bassioun and Yasmin Naqvi  
say that, an 'amnesty exception' may be inferred from several provisions of the 
Rome statute
14
." They further point out three different ways that have been 
identified under the ICC Statute to provide such leeway 
15
as follows:  
(1) By reason of admissibility of a case due to an amnesty following an 
investigation by the state of territoriality or nationality;  
(2) By the prosecutor deciding not to proceed to an investigation in the 
'interest of justice' under article 53 of the Rome Statute; and  
(3) By the Security Council deferring proceedings as a measure to maintain 
or restore peace and security.  
 
Definitely, there is a gap in the literature with regard to when and why either 
prosecution or amnesty should apply. Therefore, in this respect, this study will 
attempt to fill the gap which has been left behind, leading to states coming up with 
conflicting decisions on fulfilling the obligation erga omnes with respect to the duty 
of states to prosecute international crimes.  
 
In this regard, the case law will be drawn from States which have applied amnesty 
for perpetrators of international crimes specifically the Azania Peoples Organization 
(AZAPO) case from South Africa, the Kwoyelo case from Uganda, the Prosecutor v 
                                                 
14
 On a discussion of these possible ways to accommodate amnesties into the Rome Statute, see also 
generally, Ruth Wedgwood, "The International Criminal Court: An American View", European 
Jaurnal af Internatianal Law 10(1999) 97; Gerhard Hafner, Kristen Boon, Anne Rubesame and 
Jonathan Huston, "A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood" European 
Jaurnal af International Law 10(1999) 107; Michael P. Scharf, "The Amnesty Exception to the 
Jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court", 32 Cornel/International Law Journal 507 91999). 
15
 Op cit, Yasmin Q. Naqvi, p. 87. 
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Kallon et al from Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).  
Furthermore, the experience is drawn from other states that have granted amnesty 
including Argentina, Ecuador, EI Salvador, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile in Latin 
America and Angola, Burundi, DRC and Zimbabwe.  
 
1.9 Scope of the Study  
This study intends to discuss the duty of  States to prosecute international crimes 
and the question of amnesty from international, regional and national levels, 
particularly in Africa in which case laws have been taken from Uganda, Kenya, 
South Africa, Niger, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Senegal, DRC, Sierra Leone 
and Zimbabwe.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES FROM WORLD WAR I TO 
THE MODERN ERA 
2.1 International Crimes  
International crimes refer to crimes of the international concern, which include 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. 
International crimes involve more than the State because of differences of nationality 
of victims or perpetrators or the means employed or which concern a lesser protected 
interest which cannot be defended without international criminalization. An 
international crime may also be defined as an offence which is created by 
international law itself, without requiring the intervention of domestic law. In the 
case of such crimes, international law imposes criminal responsibility directly on 
individuals, and this is the central idea of this study.  
 
The classic statement of this form of international criminal law comes from the 
IMT's seminal statement that: "Crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced ... individuals have 
international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed 
by the individual state.
16
 Generally, crimes which are regulated by international 
criminal law are those of concern to the international community in that they 
threaten international interests
17
. In this study, international crimes refer to crimes 
                                                 
16
 IMT Judgment; Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court, 9-10; 
Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity in the International Criminal Law 
Regime (Cambridge, (2005) 1. 
17
  Opcit, Cherif Bassiouni, p. 99  
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of the international concern, which include genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and the crime of aggression (also known as the crime against peace)
18
.  
 
2.1.1 The Notion of International Crimes and the Norms of Jus Cogens 
Jus cogens is an inherent attribute of norms which safeguards public interest and 
envisages their special effect of non-derogabilitv
19
. Since jus cogens protects the 
community interest, respective absolute obligations are imposed on States towards 
the international community as a whole and not to individual States.
20
 In this regard, 
jus cogens not only postulates the hierarchy between conflicting interests, but also 
provides by its very essence, the legal tool of ensuring the maintenance and 
continuous operability of this hierarchy, depriving conflicting acts and transactions 
of States of their legal significance. A rule which is jus cogens because of the 
importance of the values it protects enjoys a higher rank in the international 
hierarchy than treaty law and even "ordinary" customary rules'
21
. 
 
The purpose of jus cogens is to safeguard overriding interests and values of the 
international community as well as distinct interests of individual States
22
. Thus, the 
emphasis as stressed on community interest as distinct from the interests of 
individual States as the basis of peremptory norms reinforces their public order 
character.  
                                                 
18
 Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2008) p.2.  
19
 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, (2006) p 68. 
20
 ibid. 
21
 Furundzijo, ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Judgement of 10 December 1998, Case No.IT-95-17/1-T; 39 
ILM (1999), para. 153. 
22
 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, 92006) p 46 
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2.1.1.1 Jus Cogens Norms and the Obligation Erga Omnes to States 
In line with jus cogens, an obligation erga omnes amounts to 'the obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole,' as explained by the 
International Criminal  Justice (ICJ).
23
 The ICJ held that 'an essential distinction 
should be drawn between obligations of a State towards the international community 
vis-a- vis another State,' and proclaimed as follows:  
"By their very nature the former are the concern of 'all States. In view 
bf the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have 
a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes
24”  
 
Bassiouni distinguishes jus cogens and erga omes as follows:  
"Jus cogens refers to the legal status that certain international crimes 
reach, and obligation erga omnes pertains to the legal implications 
arising out of a certain crime's characterization as jus cogens
25”  
 
Gradually, the notion of the obligation of the State towards the international 
community, and the interest of the international community as a whole, was 
beginning to settle in the minds of member States of the international community 
and reflected in State practice
26
. It was in 1970 that the ICJ acknowledged the 
obligation erga omnes. In the Barcelona Traction Case, the ICJ stated:  
'[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligation of 
a State towards the international community as a whole, and those 
                                                 
23
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 10 Report, p.32. 
24
 Op cit. 
25
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'International Crimes: Jus cog ens and Obligation Erga Omnes' Law 
and Contemporary Problems Vol. 59 No.4 (Autumn 1996), p. 63.  
26
 Mitsue Inazumi, 'Universal jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National 
Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law' (20050 p.39. 
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arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. 
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view 
of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to 
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligation erga 
omnes
27’  
 
Moreover, the ICJ admitted that an obligation erga omnes includes acts of 
aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, and various fundamental 
principles and rules concerning respect for human rights.  
 
2.2 The Origin of Prosecutions of International Crimes  
International crimes have been perpetrated against civilians groups since the dawn 
of time; whereby, empires were built on the subjugation, enslavement, massacres, 
and general overall ill- treatment of conquered peoples
28
. Some headway was made 
internationally for the introduction of laws against inhuman acts at the beginning of 
the last century via the Hague Convention IV of 1907 concerning the laws and 
Customs of War on Land
29
. The notion 'Crimes against humanity' for example, was 
propounded for the first time in 1915, on the occasion of mass killing of Armenians 
in the Ottoman Empire
30
. On 28 May 1915 the French, British, and Russian 
Government decided to react strongly, and jointly issued a declaration stating that:  
"In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and 
civilization, the Allied government announced publicly to the 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Clare de Than and E. Shorts' International Criminal Law and Human Rights' (2003) p. 87.  
29
 ibid. 
30
 Antonio Cassese 'International Criminal Law' 2Ed {2008} p 10l. 
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sublime Porte that they will hold personally responsible [for] these 
crimes all members of the Ottoman Government and those of who 
are implicated in such rnassacre
31
."  
 
Thus, the philosophical origin of "Crimes against humanity" lies in humanistic and 
humanitarian values, while its normative origin rests in the evolution of the 
international regulations of armed conflicts.
32
  
 
It is arguably that, while the Nuremberg Charter was the first international 
instrument to specify the contents of "Crimes against humanity", it did not create a 
new principle of international law because the notion of offences against the law of 
nations, delicti jus gentium, pre-existed the Charter by centuries
33
. In 1993 the  
ICTR was established by the UN Security Council to prosecute those responsible for 
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in the following year, the ICTR was 
established to prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in Rwanda.  
 
The major landmark in the development to provide for international accountability 
is the establishment of the ICC whereby, the ICC statutes in its preamble affirms, 
"that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by 
taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation".  
                                                 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 M. Cherif  Bassiouni 'Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law' {1992} p 148. 
33
 Ibid {p 148}. 
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Even after the creation of the ICC, direct enforcement of international criminal law 
through international courts remains the exception. Universal jurisdiction provides 
for the possibility of decentralized prosecution of international crimes by third 
states. However, this would create a comprehensive network of jurisdictional claims 
for international crimes and markedly improve the chances of ending wide spread 
impunity for international crimes
34
.  
 
Furthermore, the validity of the principle of universal jurisdiction under customary 
international law is generally acknowledged for genocide, war crimes in 
international armed conflicts, and crimes against hurnanity
35
, and is also accepted in 
regard to crimes in civil wars
36
. This authorises even third-states-that is, states with 
no special link to the crime to prosecute.  
 
Thus, it is from this standpoint, whereby States as members of the international 
community have found themselves in a cross road on whether to respect, promote 
and protect human rights by fulfilling their duty to prosecute and punish those 
perpetrators of international crimes or blanketing them.  
 
This can be achieved through recognising and granting of amnesty relying on 
national authorities, like those granted in Argentina, Chile, EI Salvador, Zimbabwe, 
Sierra Leone, Uganda and South Africa.  
                                                 
34
 Gerhard Werle, Principles oj International Criminal Law, 2
nd
 Edition (2009) p.67. 
35
 Brownlie, Principles of  Public International Law, in Edn (2008), pp.306 et sq., and p. 565. 
36
 C. Kress, 30 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2001), p.103 at pp .. 169 et sq. 
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2.3 States and the Duty to Prosecute International Crimes  
The duty to investigate and prosecute international crimes applies to all States; not 
only States Parties to the Rome Statute as the ICC Prosecutor cannot prosecute 
everything as it focuses only on the most responsible. In this respect, it is obvious 
that this results in an impunity gap in relation to lower - ranking accusation, which 
can only be filled by states, and only if: domestic laws correspond to international 
obligations; capacity exists to handle serious crimes; and if appropriate institutions 
are in place. Also, under the complementarity principle the ICC will not interfere 
with such proceedings in national jurisdiction so long as they are genuine. 
According to this principle, the ICC will only deal with cases that are not genuinely 
dealt with by national jurisdictions.  
 
A stronger argument that a duty to prosecute might emanate from the commission of 
international crimes relates to the duties of States under the law of State 
responsibility. Also, the Policy paper of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC 
states that: ' ... the system of complementarity is principally based on the 
recognition that the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction is not only a right 
but also a duty of States'
37
, Furthermore, the peremptory character of jus cogens 
crimes has also been urged to infer an obligation to prosecute. It is commonly 
asserted that 'the implications of jus cogens are those of a duty and not of 
optional rights; otherwise, jus eogens would not constitute a peremptory norm of 
international law'
38
.  
                                                 
37
 Available at: http://www.icc-cpLint!librarv!organs!otpti!30905-Policy-Paper.pdf. 
38
 Cherif  Bassiouni, "International Crimes", at 266. 
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In Kallon and Kamara, the SCSL inferred this line of reasoning law that are the 
subject of universal jurisdiction' justified by the assertion that 'the obligation to 
protect human dignity is a peremptory norm and has assumed the nature of 
obligation erga omnes
39
, This echoes the reasoning of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in the 2001 Barrios Altos case, in which the Court stated that 
Peru's amnesty laws were in admissible because, inter alia, they were intended 
to prevent the punishment of violations of non-derogable human rights.
40
 The 
Inter- American Court of Human Rights has decided on more than one occasion, 
that:  
"A state has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human 
rights violations and to use the means as its disposal to carry out a 
serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to 
identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and 
to ensure the victim adequate compensation
41
. 
 
International law not only allows the international community and the states to 
prosecute international crimes through universal jurisdiction, but even obligates 
them to do so under certain circumstances. In this regard; customary 
international law today recognizes that the State in which a crime under 
                                                 
39
 Kallon and Kamara, Decision on Amnesty case, para.71 
40
 Barrios Altos case, para.41. 
41
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case Velasquez Rodriguez, Judgement of 29 July 1988 
(ser. C) No.49hereafter, Velasquez Rodriguez case), para. 174. See also Case Neira Alegra and 
others, Judgment of 19. January 1995 (ser. C) No. 20, para. 69; Case Caballero Delgado and 
Santana, Judgment of 8 December 1995. (ser. C), No. 22, para.56; Case Blake, Preliminary 
Exceptions, Judgment of 2 July 1996 (ser. C), No. 27, para. 39 and Case Castillo Paez, Judgment of 
3 November 1997 (ser. C), No. 34, para.90.  
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international law is committed has a duty to prosecute
42
. This duty also exists 
under treaty law for genocide and war crimes in international armed conflicts
43
. 
However, the "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions obligate 
every state party to prosecute certain serious violations.  
 
In the Preamble to the ICC Statute, the contracting parties emphasize that;  
"The most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished and their effective prosecution must be 
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation," The parties recall that "it is the duty of 
every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible 
for international crimes', and underline their resolve 'to these ends ... to 
establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court .. 
44
"  
 
An academic debate in the 1990s, triggered by a 1988 decision by the inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 
45
was also useful in demonstrating duties to 
prosecute. However, States by opting to fulfill their obligation, have found 
themselves on a struggle to prosecute or whereas seen necessary to extradite these 
perpetrators of international crimes. Under this investigative study, the duty of 
States to prosecute international crimes has been raised in a number of sources.  
                                                 
42
 42 C. Kress, 30 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2001), p.103 at p .. 163, n.237; Naomi Roht 
Arriaza, in D. Shelton (ed.), International Crimes, Peace and Human Rights (2000), p.77 at p. 78. 
43
 Genocide Convention, Art. IV; Geneva Convention III, Art. 129, and Geneva Convention IV, 
Art.146; in addition, there is a treaty-based duty to prosecute if the crime under international law is 
based on torture; this derives from  
Art. 7 of the Torture Convention. 
44
 ICC Statute, Preamble (4) and (6). 
45
 Velazquez Rdriguez, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C 
No.4. 
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Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, member 
States are obliged to put an end to all 'grave breaches' set out therein. 
46
  Basically, 
these great breaches are referred to under international law as war crimes, and listed 
under Geneva Conventions. The Convention on the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
Convention) entered into force on 12 January 1952 was intended to prevent 
genocide by ensuring its punishment.  
 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention)
47
 imposes an unequivocal duty on 
State parties to prosecute acts of torture as criminal.
48
 The Convention requires 
each state party to ensure that all acts of torture are criminalized under its municipal 
laws,
49
 and to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where, inter alia, 
the alleged offender is its national.
50
  Moreover, article 7 requires state parties either 
to prosecute or extradite alleged offenders. 
51
 
 
The obligation on the part of states to investigate and prosecute 'core international 
crimes,'
52
 arguably also emanates from the Rome Statute of the ICC, as state parties 
risk an intervention by the ICC if there is no investigation or prosecution. However, 
the ratification of the Rome Statute by more than 110  States 
53
 constitutes 
                                                 
46
 V Morris & MP Scharf, An insider guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia (1995) 64-65. 
47
 Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. 
48
 Article 6 and 12 of Inter-American Convention. 
49
 Article 1 of Torture Convention. 
50
 Article 5 of Torture Convention. 
51
 Article 7 of Torture Convention. 
52
 Article 5 of the Rome Statute. 
53
 As of June 2013, 120 states had ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC. (According to the ICC 
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significant evidence of an acknowledgement of the duty to prosecute and punish 
these crimes.
54
 Furthermore, the Rome Statute apart from making no provision for 
amnesty for perpetrators of international crimes, the Statute defines crimes against 
humanity for the first time and provides for constitutive elements of the crime as 
well as their grounds for 
55
prosecution and punishment.  
 
2.4 International Crimes in International Perspective  
The duty imposed on States to prosecute international crimes has a long history in 
international arena. The blatant atrocities committed during the WW II (1939-1945) 
were not only untold, but also intolerable on the world of civilised community hence 
led to establishment of the remarkable International Military Tribunals; the IMT and 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), to try those seen to 
bear the greatest responsibilities. The experience proves that since then, there was 
no prosecution of international crimes at international level until the establishment 
.of ICTY (1993) and the ICTR (1994).  
 
The atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and the genocidal policies 
conducted in Rwanda led to the international community rather than establishing the 
ad hoc tribunals to have a permanent solution, hence the establishment of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC (1998) which came into effect in July 2002.  
 
                                                 
54
 Article 17 (1) (a)-(b) of the Rome Statute. 
55
 Rome Statute, article 7.  
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2.4.1 International Crimes under the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals  
Basically, the main function of such tribunals was to punish not only those 
government and military officials directly connected with the war itself but also to 
prosecute those alleged to have committed gross humanitarian crimes against 
civilians. The crimes included mass murder, persecution, deportation, enslavement, 
extermination, and in modern parlance "ethnic cleansing", and of course, the "Final 
Solution of the Jewish Question".  
 
However, the jurisprudence from the IMT and the Control Council Number l0 trials 
shows that, apart from rejecting the defence of obedience to superior orders, being 
acting under official policies of the state and immunity of state officials, also the 
tribunals gives no room for amnesties; except that of IMTFE which was granted to 
Emperor Hirohito by Douglas McArthur a Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Forces, in his capacity primarily based on political grounds. Thus, the applicability 
of these provisions in one way or another proves that the tribunals not only refuted 
all forms of immunities granted to the states officials to stand as bars for 
prosecutions but also it paved a way for the international community that, in the 
world of peace lovers, there is no room to tolerate perpetrators of international 
crimes.  
 
Furthermore, in affirming that the defences of immunities to State officials were not 
a bar for prosecutions at all; in May 1999 the former President of the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Slobodan Milosevic was charged (along with four 
others) with crimes against humanity and war crimes in Bosnia and Croatia between 
1991 and 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999.  
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The ICTR Statute sets out three separate categories of crimes which come  within 
the Tribunals jurisdiction; genocide Article 2 and crimes against humanity Article 3 
common to the Geneva Convention of 1949 and Additional Protocol II of 1977.
56
 
Moreover, the ICTR Statute was set out in comparable terms to that of the ICTY, 
but in some extent with many marked elementary and essential differences.  
 
Article 1 of the ICTR Statute grants the Tribunal the power to prosecute persons for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law.
57
 Also, Article 6 (2) of the 
ICTR Statute, provides that immunities of state officials shall not serve as bar nor 
mitigating factor. For instance, in Jean Kambanda case,
58
 the accused, the former 
Prime Minister of Interim Government of Rwanda from April 8 to July 17, 1994, 
was charged and found guilty on Genocide, complicity in genocide and crimes 
against humanity, despite his immunity as a Prime Minister.  
 
Moreover, the ICTR trials continue to prove that immunity of state officials do not 
benefit from immunity accorded to them by national or international law, especially 
where such officials have been charged with international crimes. The Tribunal 
significantly cemented the position in Akayesu case, where it was held that:  
"It had been previously recognized that only public officials or 
government officials could be held criminal liable for serious violations 
of Common Article 3 and Additional protocol II. It now appears from 
the dictum of the Appeal Chamber in Akayesu case  that any individual, 
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 Article 4. 
57
 The ICRT Statute, Art.I. 
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24 
irrespective of their status; i.e. government or otherwise, may be 
criminally responsible for violations of this particular Article.
59
  
 
Thus, from the above experience as can one draw from Akayesu  case that, under 
the international law, the official position of defendants, whether as Head of State or 
responsible officials in government departments, shall not be considered as freeing 
them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.  
 
The efforts to create the ICC however materialised in 1998 when the Rome Statute 
was officially drafted hence coming into effect in July 2002. The Rome Statute 
enumerates a list of international crimes under Article 5. Moreover, Articles 6 to 9 
provide a range of constituting ingredients for each respective crime. Since it 
become into operations the ICC have initiated investigations, issued summonses and 
tried individuals accused for perpetrating international crimes including Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Central Africa Republic (CAR), Hassan AI Bashir (Sudan), Muammar 
Gadaffi (Libya), Bosco Ntaganda Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Joseph 
Kony Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and the famous known as 'Ocampo Six' from 
Kenya.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
Since the establishment of the ICC, rulers who have committed international crimes 
including Genocide Article 6, crimes against humanity Article 7 and war crimes 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute have found their hide-out of immunity or even the 
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 Prosecutor II, Jeon-Paul Akayesu. 
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exile options substantially diminished. The evidence is the emergence of a new era 
of power mongers like Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Museveni  (Uganda), Kibaki (Kenya), 
the attempt of  Abdullaye Wade of  Senegal and currently the activities of Assad in 
Syria. In this regards, the ICC as a court of the last resort, today's world has become 
one of the stumbling blocks for prevalence of the culture of impunity which for a 
long time seems to exist from the era of the Nuremberg Charter.  
 
However, the world will never be the same after the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court. 
60
This is due to fact that, the establishment of the ICC 
with its developed elements of crimes, marks the new era of states to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
their obligation to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. This also marks 
the end of a historical process that started since the Nuremberg Charter in 1945 as 
well as the beginning of a new phase in the history of international criminal justice.  
 
Thus, by forming the ICC as court of the last resort, perpetrators of international 
crimes irrespective of wherever they are have found themselves lacking hide-out. 
Hence, the future world of rule of law as well as human rights observers is 
promising. 
                                                 
60
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 DEVELOPMENTS ON AMNESTY IN PRACTICE 
3.1 The Concept of Amnesty  
"Amnesty" comes from amnesia. "Amnesia", which means "loss of memory or an 
act of oblivion/forgetfulness". 
61
Hence, in etymological terms, the oldest term is 
"oblivion" and it appears frequently in old peace treaties to denote forgiveness 
granted to a group of persons guilty of crimes committed during a war.
62
 In the 
Encyclopaedia of Human Rights, amnesty is defined as:  
“….. the absolution, or overlooking by a government of an offence 
of a political nature, such as treason or rebellion, frequently on 
condition that the offender resumes his or her duties as a citizen 
within a prescribed period.
63
 
 
The Dictionary of International Law and Diplomacy define amnesty as ' ...immunity 
for acts done during the war without sufficient authority or in excess of authority. 
Provision for these matters is usually included in the treaty of peace.
64
 
 
According to Black's Law Dictionary, amnesty is defined as 'a sovereign act of 
forgiveness for past acts, granted by a government to all persons (or to certain 
classes of persons) who have been guilty of crime or delict, generally political 
offenses,-treason, sedition, rebellion, draft evasion, - and often conditioned upon 
their return to obedience and duty within a prescribed time'.  
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In a legal parlance, amnesty is a sovereign act of forgiveness or general oblivion for 
past offences, often granted before a trial or conviction by a Head of State, an 
executive body, to a large group of persons guilty of specific conduct or crimes. 
Amnesty is granted, usually in peace treaty or agreement, on condition that those 
responsible abandoned a course or hostilities. That is the granting of amnesty is 
premised on certain conditions, such as the cessation of military attacks against the 
government of a day.  
 
3.1.1 The Common Concepts Associated with Amnesty  
3.1.1.1 Amnesty and Impunity  
The relationship between impunity and amnesty laws is to be found in the fact that 
in many cases amnesty laws serve as the source of impunity, especially where 
reconciliation is officially imposed on victims of gross human rights violations by 
the political elite. A good example is what happened in Sierra Leone, South Africa 
and Uganda just to point few.  
 
Literally, the term impunity means that the government does not investigate crimes 
committed, and that they are ignored or denied. Impunity is the result of a deliberate 
attempt by authorities to cover up or ignore certain human rights violations by 
taking no action against those criminally responsible. In this regard, impunity may 
take different forms, depending on the circumstances of each case. Robert 
Garreton.
65
 Identifies four types of impunity namely, legal, political, moral and 
historical.  
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Legal impunity occurs when legal means are used to ignore or deny victims of 
human rights violations justice through amnesty laws. Legal impunity further 
manifests itself when crimes committed are reserved for military courts, or national 
security laws are used to prevent future investigations or the prosecution of those 
responsible for violation of international crimes. Political impunity occurs when 
those who were once dictators and assassins are legally elected as Presidents, 
Ministers or congressmen after leaving office.  
 
Moral impunity arises when, despite the crimes committed, the perpetrator justifies 
his action on the basis that they were done to 'save the county' or 'to protect certain 
values.' The perpetrator does not feel any remorse for his action, or fear that he will 
one day be prosecuted and judged for what he has done.  
 
3.1.1:2 Amnesty and Immunity  
Immunity is another variant of impunity which provides protection against 
prosecution for heads of state developed in international customary law.
66
 It is 
further developed to also cover State officials, including Ministers for foreign affairs, 
Heads of government and also a king or queen. This immunity prevents the 
application of remedies for victims of human rights violations.  
 
3.1.1.3 Amnesty and Statute of Limitations  
Another concept which may be associated with amnesty is the doctrine of Statute of 
Limitations, which means that if investigations or prosecutions are not undertaken 
within a prescribed period, subsequent criminal or civil proceedings will be nullified 
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on the basis that the time frame within which such action should have been brought 
has expired.  
 
However, it must be noted that, serious violations of human rights and international  
humanitarian law such as, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are not 
subject to a statute of limitations.
67
 This means that those responsible for 
international crimes must be sent to justice irrespective of when such offences were 
committed.  
 
3.1.1.4 Amnesty and Pardon  
Unlike amnesty, a pardon is usually granted to individuals any time after conviction 
or sentence. It serves a number of purposes, namely to allow the accused to make a 
fresh beginning because he or she has refrained from entanglement with the law and 
thus, deserves an opportunity to start fresh; to correct miscarriages of justice and to 
mitigate the harshness of a sentence.
68
 For example, after 1996 the Advisory Legal 
Services Directorate of the Department of Justice and Constitution Development of 
the Republic of South Africa based on past experiences with the granting of pardon 
by the President, developed general policy guidelines for application for pardon in 
terms of section 84(2) of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa to clear criminal 
records. 
69
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3.2 The Working Definition of Amnesty  
The purpose of differentiating between amnesty and other related concept is to avoid 
confusion between amnesty, as understood in this study, and the other related 
concepts referred to earlier. It is apparent thus far that although there is no uniform 
practice by state to free offenders for whatever reasons they may deem fit, amnesty 
has definitive elements, which distinguish it from the related concept discussed 
above. In this study, for purpose of a working definition, amnesty is defined as:  
A sovereign act of forgiveness, exemption or general oblivion 
from criminal prosecution, or any other form of punishment for 
past offences associated with harmful acts committed for 
political purpose by state and non-state agents granted by a 
head of state, a legislative body or a body established in terms 
of legislation, to a group of identified person available for a 
fixed period of time, which may, or not, be predicated upon the 
fulfillment of certain condition.  
 
Having discussed the meaning and definitive elements of amnesty and associated 
concepts, we now examine how amnesty is reflected in different international 
instruments.  
 
3.2.1 Amnesty in International Law Position  
Article 6(5) Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions seems to stand in 
favour of States granting of amnesties at the end of conflicts. However, the 
international law neither completely prohibits nor completely authorises States to 
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amnesty those accused of international crimes.
70
 The obvious weakness is that the 
international law does provide clear principles which assist in the evaluation of the 
legality of amnesties for international crimes
71
. In this regard, the State's obligation 
to prosecute and punish those responsible for committing certain violations 
establishes a minimal requirement of accountability.  
 
Courts have indicated that amnesties which come into being through democratic 
processes
72
 or which have resulted from multi-party negotiations have more 
legitimacy than self-granted amnesties,
73
 which violate the principle of self-judging. 
74
Amnesties which are designed to hide the truth and block investigations have been 
held to violate the victim's and society's right to the truth. Hence, only amnesties 
which allow victims to know the truth about events which occurred have been 
considered legitimate. They include those which are tied to disclosure about 
politically-motivated crimes in a truth commission or co-operation with an 
investigation.  
 
It has also been argued that amnesties should be granted by a formal procedure that 
examines each individual candidate and imposes specific conditions for accepting 
the amnesty application based on the need for the truth to be told and to encourage 
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rights-respecting behaviour;
75
 Furthermore, laws which cover whole groups of 
people without any review process should not be considered legitimate. A 
provisional amnesty that may be made permanent depending on the beneficiary 
fulfilling the conditions may be a regulated way to find the correct balance of 
restorative justice. However, it should be notable that, those considered 'most 
responsible' for the perpetration of international crimes; including leaders planners 
and facilitators should not escape the prosecutorial net.  
 
There is, however, a trend in practice towards the restriction of amnesties for serious  
international crimes. In the Lome Amnesty Case the SCSL suggested that there is a 
'crystallizing international norm that a government cannot grant amnesty for serious 
violations of serious crimes under international law
76
, For example, in 2005, 
Argentina's Supreme Court declared unconstitutional two laws of 1986-87, which 
effectively conferred amnesties on those responsible for violating human rights in 
Argentina's 'Dirty War' of 1976-83
77
.  
 
3.2.2 Amnesty and the Versailles Peace Treaty  
Immediately following the outbreak of the WWI, the Commission on 
responsibilities of the authors of war and on enforcement of penalties was 
established to examine allegations of war crimes committed by the Central 
Powers.
78
 Offence against the law and customs of war, known as 'Hague law' 
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because of their roots in the 1899 and 1907 Conventions are codified in the 1993 
Statute of ICTY,
79
 and in Article 8(2) (b), (e) and (f) of the Statute of the ICC. This 
provision is known as the Martens clause, as named after the Russian Diplomat who 
drafted it.
80
 Basically, the Hague Convention, as international treaty was meant to 
impose obligations and duties upon states.  
 
3.2.3 Amnesty in the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Military Tribunal  
The Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention actually encourages states to 
grant the "broadest possible amnesty" at the end of hostilities in non-international 
armed conflict.
81
 For instance, an informally agreed amnesty was linked to the 
accord between German and Austria of 11 July 1936, which granted amnesty to all 
Nazis, except those convicted for the most serious crimes.
82
 At the end of WW II, 
prosecution became the focus for dealing with Nazi war criminals leading to the 
Nuremberg trial and subsequent prosecutions and amnesty agreements concluded 
with Axis countries did not contain amnesty clauses.
83
  
 
3.2.4 Amnesty and the International Tribunals  
The International Community in the last decades has intensified its efforts to create 
international mechanisms for prosecuting and punishing individuals accused of 
particularly grave human right violations. The establishment of the Criminal 
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was intended to ensure that 
perpetrators of the most serious crime were brought to justice. However, none of 
these tribunals seems to provide room for amnesty. The Security Council 
establishing the Tribunal was:  
"Determined to put an end to sush crimes and to take effective measures 
to bring to justice persons who are responsible for them, Convinced that 
in the particular circumstance the prosecution of person responsible for 
serious violation of international humanitarian law would enable this aim 
to be achieved and would contribute to the process of National 
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace"
3 
  
 
The implication of this argument is that international law prohibits amnesty. This 
was spelt out by the Trial Chamber of the ICTV in Prosecutor v. Furundzija,
84
 
which held that amnesties for torture are null and void and will not receive foreign 
recognition. More recently, the special Court for Sierra Leone was established to 
contribute to the process of National reconciliation and to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace". It has the power to prosecute person who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of International humanitarian law and Sierra 
Leonean law. In Prosecutor v Morris Kallon & Brima Bazzy Kamara (SCSL),
85
 it 
was noted that insurgents are subject to international humanitarian law and are 
bound to observe the Geneva Convention.  
 
3.2.5 Amnesty and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
The potential tension between the ICC and the alternative forms of justice remains a 
moot question. This tension was evident when appeals for the recognition of 
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amnesty were raised during the Plenipotentiary Conference for the ICC in Rome in 
1998, which resulted in the Rome Statute. No agreement was reached on how the 
future Court should deal with efforts by States to resolve conflicts other than 
through prosecution and punitive justice when dealing with crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. However, according to a number of commentators, there 
are essentially three different ways that have been identified under the ICC Statute 
to provide such leeway for amnesty:  
(1) By reason of inadmissibility of a care due to an amnesty following an 
investigation by the statute of territory or Nationality;  
(2) By the prosecution deciding not to proceed to an investigation in the interest of  
justice and;  
(3) The Security Council deferring proceedings as a measure to maintain or restore  
peace and security.  
 
This provision appears to recognize that peace and justice may conflict at certain 
moments in time, and if the Security Council determines that a prosecution by the 
ICC might threaten international peace and security, it may stay the prosecution for 
as long as that threat remains. Moreover, the recent hard-line policy of the UN not to 
recognise amnesties for international crimes in any circumstances would also make 
such a resolution even more difficult to conceive. 
86
 
 
The notion of justice has to be interpreted within the context of the Rome Statute, 
which is concerned first and foremost with criminal justice. The term is left 
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undefined, although some elements are mentioned that should guide the Prosecutor 
in this regard: the gravity of the offence, the interests of the victims, the age or 
infirmity of the perpetrator and the role he or she played. 
87
 
 
3.3 The Position of National Laws on Amnesty  
3.3.1 Nature, scope of laws and States practice from Africa and Latin American 
experience  
In the past twenty years, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, 
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Algeria 
have granted amnesty to persons who had absolute and unconditional amnesty to 
those persons who committed "political crimes with ramifications, or common 
crimes committed by no less than twenty people" before the 1
st
 of January,1992.  
 
In Argentina, during Alfonsin's  presidency, the judiciary annulled an amnesty that 
the military had granted to itself before leaving power and prosecutions began. 
However, unrest grew amongst the military, especially as lower-ranking officers 
were called into court. The government first responded by limiting the time frame 
for new complaints to be brought to sixty days. When this strategy was 
unsuccessful, the government passed a law in effect granting amnesty to many those 
who had committed human rights abuses during the 1970s.  
 
The law extinguished penal liability for persons below the rank of colonel, and 
others who were not chiefs of security forces, by creating an irrefutable presumption 
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that lower officers were merely following higher orders and thus were not liable for 
their actions!, Soon after, the Supreme Court of Argentina upheld the 
constitutionality of the law.  
 
In Chile In 1978, General Pinochet issued an amnesty decree to "all persons who 
committed criminal offenses during the period of the State of Siege, between 11 
September 1993 and 10 March 1978" 
88
As enacted, the law created a blanket 
amnesty which protected persons, whether convicted or not, from prosecution 
for non excluded criminal acts. Some common crimes were accepted from the 
amnesty, including infanticide, armed robbery, rape, incest, fraud, 
embezzlement, dishonesty and drunk driving.
89
 However, murder, kidnapping, 
and assault were not covered. 
90
 
 
The Chilean amnesty law has been challenged at least twice.
91
 The Supreme Court 
of Chile held in both cases that amnesty was constitutional and consistent with 
international law.
92
 In doing so, it overruled lower court opinions which had struck 
down the amnesty. However, certain lower courts continue to open investigations 
into cases of forced disappearance under the "Aylwin doctrine"  which holds that 
courts may investigate cases in order to determine whether, under their facts, the 
amnesty law is applicable.
93
 Chilean courts have convicted military and secret 
police personnel of murder and other crimes in cases not covered by the amnesty, 
most notably the former Head of the Secret Police, General Manuel Contreras, and 
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his assistant, Brigadier Pedro Espinoza, for the murder of Orlando Letelier and 
Ronni Moffit.
94
  
 
3.3.1.1 EI Salvador  
In 1993 the Constitutional Court of EI Salvador found the amnesty to be consistent 
with the Salvadoran Constitution.
95
 Since then, courts have applied the amnesty in 
several cases. For example, in the case of Santos Guevara Portillo, FMLN members 
shot down a US military helicopter that was on an unauthorized flight. One 
American soldier died in the plane crash and two others were killed after the crash 
when the FMLN members allegedly shot them. 
96
 
 
3.3.1.2 Peru  
In 1995, three years after the Sendero's main leaders were captured, Peru passed a 
sweeping amnesty law.
97
 Unlike most other amnesties, this law was not passed in 
order to promote national reconciliation after the fall of authoritarian rule, or a 
negotiated end to a civil war. Rather, it granted amnesty only to police, military 
personnel, and civilians condemned for acts linked with the fight against terrorism 
for the fifteen year period between 1980 and 1995.
98
 The amnesty is limited to 
counterterrorists, Sendero members or those found to be associated with the Sendero 
or other armed groups who may be found criminally and civilly liable for any of 
their actions. Furthermore, there is neither truth commission nor other means of 
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reparation for victims of human rights abuses.  
 
3.3.1.3 South Africa  
South Africa presents an interesting and unique experience in states practice in 
granting amnesty to perpetrators of international crimes. The Parliament enacted the 
Truth and Reconciliation Act of 1995 (TRA) in which Section 20 (7) of the TRA 
protects certain persons who have committed political human rights abuses from 
civil and criminal liability. 
99
 
 
South Africa's Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (1995) provide 
that one of the functions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is to:  
"facilitate and promote the granting of amnesty in respect of acts 
associated with political objectives, by receiving from persons 
desiring to make a full disclosure of all the relevant facts, 
applications for the granting of amnesty in respect of such acts, 
and transmitting such applications to the Committee on Amnesty 
for its decision, and by publishing decisions granting amnesty, in 
the Gazette.
100
 
 
The South Africa's model of amnesty differs from previous cases; persons do not 
receive amnesty, unless they present themselves to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC} and make a "full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to 
                                                 
99
 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Act No.34 of 1995, Section 20(7), in GG 
16574 of 26 July 1995 (colloquially known as the Truth and Reconciliation Act) [hereinafter TRA). 
100
 South Africa, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995, Article 4(c). 
  
40 
acts associated with a political objective”. 101The Commission's duties also include 
allowing the victims an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations, 
and recommending reparations. 
102
 
 
3.3.1.4 Sierra Leone  
After a prolonged period of civil war which casted lives of innocent women and 
children and left majority wounded in thousands in Sierra Leone, in July 1999, the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Government of Sierra Leone signed a 
Peace Agreement in Lome, Togo (as commonly known as "Lome Agreement"). The 
amnesty granted unconditional and free pardon to all participants in the conflict. 
However, the experience of Sierra Leone with regard to its two amnesties contained 
in the 1996 Abidjan Agreement and in the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement also 
indicates that the granting of amnesties does not necessarily lead to lasting peace.  
 
3.3.1.5 Burundi  
The 1993 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, allowed the 
transitional National Assembly to pass a law or laws, on the one hand, to provide a 
framework for the granting of amnesty for political crimes consistent with 
international law,
103
 while on the other hand it emphasised values of solidarity, 
forgiveness, mutual tolerance, respect for others and for oneself (Obup/asoni) and 
Ubuntu (humanism and character). By Article 22 (2) (c) of Protocol II to the 2000 
Arusha Peace and reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, which forms an integral 
part of the Agreement, the National Assembly of Burundi agreed "pending the 
                                                 
101
 Op cit (225, Section 3(1) (b). 
102
 ibid (226, Section 3(1) (c). 
103
 Article 8(1) (b) of the Arusha Peace Accord of 1993. 
  
41 
installation of a transnational Government [to] adopt such legislation as is necessary 
for the granting of temporary immunity against prosecution for politically motivated 
crimes prior to the signature of the Agreement".  
 
3.3.1.6 Angola  
Angola is a recent example of an amnesty as part of the disarmament, 
demobilisation of armed opposition groups. In November 1994, UNITA and the 
MPLA government of Angola signed the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement, which 
promised to grant amnesty for crimes committed during the armed conflict.
104
 
Subsequently, on 4 April 2002, UNITA and the MPLA forces signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the cessation of hostilities and the 
resolution of the outstanding military issues under the Lusaka Protocol. 
105
 
 
3.3.1.7 The Democratic Republic of Congo  
In the DRC the amnesty process was to be administered by an ad hoc Commission 
headed by the Minister of Justice established to ensure the application of the 
Presidential Decree on Amnesty.
106
 
 
Furthermore, amnesty was also granted as part of the demilitarisation, disarmament 
and reintegration process in the DRC in 2001.
107
 Article 8 of the Cease- fire 
Agreement in the DRC provided that:  
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" ... [the granting) of amnesty to the rank and file of Armed Groups 
who are not suspected "genocidaires" will be a much needed 
incentive to surrender. Amnesty laws should be adhered to by the 
amnesty granting countries. Monitoring Teams will be required to 
check on abuse."  
 
3.4 Theories and Position on Granting Amnesty versus Prosecution of International 
Crimes Apart from recognising the existence of amnesty, 'Realist School' turns its 
attention to preventing further violations, and their rivals 'Liberalist School' 
emphasizes the need to provide accountability for existing victims of violations. In 
other words, this has sometimes been characterised as the tension between peace 
and justice. Basically, one can argue that the two broad schools of thoughts account 
for the achievement and maintenance of peace. This is due to the fact that, while 
"Realist approach" views a policy of non-prosecution as often being the only way to 
induce warring parties to come to the negotiating table, (for granting of amnesties) 
on the contrary, the 'Liberalist approach' claims that a lasting peace must be 
predicated up on a sense of justice (that is prosecution).  
 
The main argument in favour of granting amnesties is that they represent a useful 
tool to end civil wars or military stand-offs and, therefore, prevent further 
bloodshed. This views amnesties as a political necessity in reaching peace 
agreement. It was until few years ago, such justification was used by United Nations 
(UN) in pressing Government to enact amnesty laws. For example, in Haiti the UN 
and United States of America (USA) pressured President Aristide to grant a full 
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amnesty, as a part of the Governors Island Agreement,
108
 to the members of 
Generals Cedras and Brigadier General Biamby's military regime which was 
responsible for killing and torturing over 3000 civilian political opponents from1990 
to 1994.
109
 The UN Security Council gave its full support to the Agreement which it 
described as 'the only valid framework for resolving the crisis in Haiti'
110
. Similar 
arguments about the political necessity of amnesty laws have been made in relation 
to the political transition in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and EI Salvador.  
 
On the other hand, supporters of Liberalist approach provide that criminal 
indictments may serve to shorten the political future of dangerous political players 
and remove them from existing power structures. In  this respect, the good recourse 
of case law is the exile of Charles Taylor to Nigeria and eventually transferred to 
The Hague to face charges before the SCSL. It is hoped that a similar result will 
occur in relation to the indictment of the ICC against Joseph Kony, a leader of the 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and three of his top Commanders.  
 
Basically, 'Liberalist' approach bases on the view that there can be no peace without 
justice, and there can be no justice without accountability.
111
 The argument is that a 
new democratic regime or a fragile state in the aftermath of an armed conflict built 
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on foundations of impunity and a forgotten record of human right atrocities will not 
be tenable and will inevitably disintegrate or at least hamper the collective 
psychological rebuilding process of the society
112
.  
 
However, experience shows that, where truth commission has been set up in 
transitional societies, amnesties may be the only incentive to induce those 
responsible for crimes to expose or acknowledge facts about the past, and thereby 
provide some form of redress to victims. The best example of this is in South 
Africa, where a quasi-judicial Amnesty Commission was established under the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act to consider applications for 
Amnesty.
113
 In addition, criminal trials generally focus on one individual and 
sometimes just one act at a time, whereas a truth commission seeks to document a 
whole picture of abuse. Similarly, systematic documentation of violations may shed 
more light on the causes of the conflict or the practices of the previous regime and 
can, therefore, address institutional as well as individual accountability. 
114
 
 
3.4.1 International versus National Laws  
The ‘Princeton Principles’ declare that universal jurisdiction may be exercised by a 
competent and ordinary judicial body of any state in order to try a person duly 
accused of committing serious crimes under international law, provided that the 
person is present before such judicial body.
115
 Individuals have certain legal 
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obligations that transcend obligations to the State. When an individual violates these 
international legal obligations, he or she is subject to prosecution by a domestic or 
international court that exercises internationally accepted norms of due process. 
Thus, it is arguably that international law has a "vertical relationship" to domestic 
law.
116
 
 
The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
117
 and that 
of Rwanda,
118
 established in 1993 and 1994 respectively, by the UN Security 
Council, pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, is also silent on amnesties. The clear implication is that no national 
amnesty would constitute a bar to proceedings since this would defeat the object and 
purpose of the Tribunals.  
 
Interestingly, the only Court of the former Yugoslavia to have adopted an amnesty 
law, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in relation to the internal armed 
conflict in 2001 between government forces and the National Liberation Army 
(NLA) contained an exception for crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the 
ICTV.
119
 This supports the contention that the ICTR would not countenance an 
amnesty law as a barrier to its exercise of jurisdiction. The Rome Statute of the ICC, 
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which entered into force in July 2, 2002, is similarly silent on the provision of 
amnesties.  
 
The UN Charter on Human Rights, which drafted the ICCPR, extensively debated 
the nature of a State Party's duty under Article 2(3) to provide an 'effective remedy' 
for violations of the Covenant, including considering the possibility of explicitly 
requiring State Parties to prosecute and punish violators.
120
 In its General comment 
20 concerning Article 7 (the right to be free from torture), the Committee stated 
that:  
"Amnesty is generally incompatible with the duty of States to 
investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within 
their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in the-future, 
States may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective 
remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation as may 
be possible.
121
  
 
In the same stand point, the United Nations has often taken the position that 
domestic amnesties for perpetrators of serious crimes under international law are not 
legitimate under international law. In this regard, the UN has criticized amnesties on 
several occasions in the last decade. For example, in 2000 during the creation of the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone, the then UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan 
reported:  
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"While recognizing that amnesty is an accepted legal concept and a 
gesture of peace and reconciliation at the end of a civil war or an 
internal armed conflict, the UN has consistently maintained the 
position that amnesty cannot be granted in respect of  international 
crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or other 
serious of international humanitarian law".
122
  
 
Similarly, in August 2004 the UN Secretary- General's report to the Security 
Council on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, Kofi Annan argued that 
Security Council resolutions and mandates should "reject any endorsement of 
amnesty for genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity, including those 
relating to ethnic, gender and sexually based international crimes, [and] ensure that 
no such amnesty previously granted is a bar to prosecution before any United 
Nations - created or assisted court". 
123
 
 
3.4.1.1 The Controversy Between the Two Mechanisms to Justice  
In the wake of contemporary conflicts, two seemingly contradictory but 
complementary trends have emerged. One trend is a general acknowledgement that 
the current momentum towards a comprehensive international criminal justice 
system is in itself inadequate to deal with complex political emergencies. The other 
is that non-punitive mechanisms, such as truth commissions are necessary to bring 
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about lasting peace and reconciliation among the local population. Furthermore, 
international criminal tribunals generally fail to address reparations for the actual 
harm suffered by victims of war, or to engage in a pedagogical exercise capable of 
reconstructing national identity as a lesson for future generations.  
 
To educate, to make formally public institutional memory, to address the collective 
guilty of various parts of the population, and to set the historical record straight 
about what really happened in the past, all came within the purview of such non-
punitive measures as a truth and reconciliation exercise.
124
 However, both 
international criminal tribunals and Truth Commissions have distinct, but 
complementary, roles and functions.
125
  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
It is self evident that, in the wake of contemporary conflicts two seemingly 
contradictory but complementary trends have emerged. One trend is a general 
acknowledgement that the current momentum towards a comprehensive 
International criminal justice system is, in itself, inadequate to deal with complex 
political emergencies. Non-punitive mechanisms such as truth commissions are 
necessary to bring about lasting peace and reconciliation among the local 
population. The reason for this is, as Heyner correctly puts it "partly due to the 
limited reach of the courts, and partly out of recognition that even successful 
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prosecutions do not resolve the conflict and pain associated with past abuses.
126
  
 
In this sense, national reconciliation is needed to complement the weaknesses of the  
international criminal justice system. For example, the role of the current ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in bringing 
about justice is limited. Generally, these tribunals are unable to try all the 
perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law, but usually reach those 
who bear the greatest responsibility for such responsibilities, the situation which is 
similar to the SCSL.  
 
With regard to internal armed conflicts, the situation is even more conflicting due to 
the fact that, amnesties are not only permitted, but are encouraged by Article 6(5) of 
Additional Protocol II,
127
 which provides that at the end of the hostilities, 'the 
authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to 
persons who have participated in the armed conflict'. Therefore, several national 
courts have relied on this provision to support their positions that general amnesties 
are valid under international law.
128
 On the view of the international community and 
the international criminal law respectively, this leeway has intensified the conflict 
between international and national perspectives on amnesty. In the next chapter we 
evaluate arguments on the conflict between amnesty and prosecution of international 
crimes, with a view to stating the position on which mechanisms should be used and 
why.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AMNESTY AND PROSECUTION 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the conflicting positions between prosecution and amnesty 
by looking at international and national perspectives. The study presents case 
studies from African and Latin American States where crimes were committed 
and such States opted for amnesty. It considers the arguments both in support of 
prosecution of international crimes and arguments in favour of amnesty. After 
looking at both positions, the chapter offers the position that this study takes.  
 
Principally, the study argues in favour of prosecution of international crimes 
based on customary international law obligation imposed on States to prosecute 
and punish perpetrators of international crimes. Arguments are also presented 
that jus cogens norms create an erga omnes obligations for States to apply 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes. Amnesties may 
sometimes prevent national courts from exercising jurisdiction over perpetrators 
of international crimes. However, foreign national courts may apply universal 
jurisdiction and disregard amnesty granted by other courts. This means, even if 
one State grants amnesty to certain individuals, other states may still be entitled 
to prosecute the perpetrators under universal jurisdiction.  
 
More on jus cogens, the study argues that these are higher norms that obligate 
States to punish persons responsible for international  crimes and such norms are 
higher than the lower standard adopted by states to grant amnesty to perpetrators 
of international crimes. The study challenges amnesty granted by states, with 
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particular reference to South Africa which granted amnesty to perpetrators of 
apartheid. It argues that by granting amnesty to such individuals, South Africa 
acted contrary to its national obligations under the Constitution of South Africa 
and also international obligations imposed on all states to prosecute and punish 
perpetrators of international crimes. It concludes that whereas national 
authorities have capacity to grant amnesty for crimes (including international 
crimes) as was the case for South Africa, such amnesties cannot be accepted by 
international courts. This conclusion is based on the established jurisprudence of 
international courts, especially the Special Court for Sierra Leone which 
disregarded amnesty granted to perpetrators of international crimes.  
 
4.2 Legal Basis for Amnesty  
The centre-piece in the discussion on the legality of amnesty is often rooted in 
international humanitarian law treaties while those who contend for prosecution of 
perpetrators of international crimes tend to find basis under international criminal 
law treaties and customary international law. The issue which inevitably arises here 
is whether international criminal law can sometimes surpass international 
humanitarian law in certain circumstances despite the fact that international criminal 
law is primarily intended to reinforce and complement international humanitarian 
law.  
 
Two conflicting or competing perspectives have existed for a long time now since 
1977 regarding amnesty. Different scholars have pondered whether amnesty is 
accepted under international law or whether it can be limited under certain 
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circumstances,
129
 perhaps permitted by international law.  
 
Generally, one should note that amnesty has been a matter of treaty law, national 
laws and state practice for a long period. Before discussing amnesty as reflected in 
modern treaties and agreements it is important to briefly talk about amnesty as 
contained in ancient treaties. Amnesty was recognized in the Westphalia Peace 
Treaty on 24 October 1648 after the war which engulfed the whole of the Roman 
Empire. The treaty provided for amnesty in the following terms: "There shall be on 
the one side and the other a perpetual oblivion, amnesty, or pardon of all that has 
been committed since the beginning of these troubles [ ... ] in words, writings, and 
outrageous actions, in violence, hostilities, damages and expenses.” 130 
 
The above provision recognised a perpetual amnesty in respect of all acts 
committed during the war. Since then, amnesty became one of the key aspects in 
peace negotiations. Treaties that followed included amnesty provisions.  
 
During the 17th century France signed peace treaties with other Powers in Europe, 
and in most of these treaties amnesty provisions were explicitly provided. For 
example, on 7 November 1659, France and Spain signed a Treaty of Pyrenees 
under which Article IV thereof provided that 'whatsoever hath been done, or hath 
happened upon occasion of the present Wars, or during the same, shall be put into 
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perpetual oblivion’.131 The Treaty of Ryswick of 20 September 1697 between 
France and the Great Britain contained an amnesty in its article 2 in the following 
terms:  
[A]II offences, Injuries, Damages, which the said King of Great Britain and his 
Subjects, or the said most Christian King and his Subjects have suffered from each 
other during this War, shall be forgotten. 
 
Equally, the Treaty of Hubertsburg of 1756 signed in Austria stated in Article II 
that:  
"Both sides shall grant a general amnesty and totally wipe from their 
memory all hostilities, losses, damage, and injuries whatever their 
nature committed or sustained on either side during the recent 
disturbances ... No subject on either side shall ever be troubled but 
shall enjoy this amnesty and all its effects to the full .... " 
132
 
 
Article 1 of the Treaty of Paris of 10 February 1763 that put to an end the Anglo-
French conflict over North America also had an amnesty provision which provided 
that [t]here shall be a general oblivion of everything that may have been done or 
committed before, or since the commencement of the war, which is just ended,
133
 
The same situation was continued in Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 
30 May 1814 between France and Great Britain which stopped the Napoleonic 
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Wars. The provision provided that:
134
 
"The High Contracting Parties, desirous to bury in entire oblivion the 
dissensions which have agitated Europe, declare and promise that no 
individual, of whatever rank or condition he may be, in the Countries 
restored and ceded by the present Treaty, shall be prosecuted, 
disturbed ... under any pretext whatsoever ... "  
 
After World War I, the Versailles Treaty of 1919 which ended the World War I 
contained Article 227 which expressly rejected amnesty and called for prosecution 
of the German Kaiser. Despite this, amnesty was recognized in other treaties signed 
after World War I. This is evidenced by the Treaty of Brest-Litovisk signed on 3 
March 1918 between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey and the Soviet 
Union recognized amnesty in its Articles 23 up to 27.
135
  
 
4.2.1 Amnesty in Treaties and Agreements  
Although the post-World War II developments led to the deterioration of the 
recognition of amnesty after armed conflicts, there are certainly some examples to 
indicate that international law itself has codified amnesty. The drastic changes were 
recorded in the context of international humanitarian law in 1977 when the Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 
1977
136
 was adopted. This Protocol encourages parties to armed conflicts to grant 
the broadest possible amnesty to anyone who participates in the conflicts.  
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It is therefore necessary to conclude that truly, amnesty is a matter of treaty or 
agreements as demonstrated above. Regarding amnesty granted to the rebels in 
Sierra Leone, as observed above, such rebels were to benefit absolutely free from 
judicial actions in Sierra Leone-even for war crimes and crimes against humanity-
crimes that were largely committed in Sierra Leone during the non-international 
armed conflict. It must be understood, however, that such amnesty could only exist 
before national courts of Sierra Leone as Article IX expressly provides. Whether 
that amnesty would bar international courts or even foreign national courts from 
prosecuting perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 
Sierra Leone is another question which must be answered for the matter touches on 
the duty imposed on states to prosecute and punish international crimes, individually 
or collectively. This will be done in the next part of this chapter. Suffice at this stage 
to highlight that in most cases, amnesty is a matter of law and treaty.  
 
Another example of amnesty provision is found in Article 22 (2) c) of Protocol II to 
the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi,
137
 an integral part of 
the agreement. Under this provision the National Assembly of Burundi agreed, 
'pending the installation of a transnational Government [to] adopt such legislation as 
is necessary for the granting of temporary immunity against prosecution for 
politically motivated crimes prior to the signature of the Agreement.' Similarly, in 
2002 following the armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC provided for amnesty to 
elements and entities that had participated in the armed conflict in the DRC. It 
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provided that:  
"To achieve national reconciliation, amnesty shall be granted for acts of 
war, political offences and opinion offences, with the exception of war 
crimes, crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. To this effect, the 
transitional national assembly shall adopt an amnesty law in accordance 
with universal principles and international law. On a provisional basis, 
and until the amnesty law is adopted and promulgated, amnesty shall be 
promulgated by presidential decree-law. The principle of amnesty shall 
be established in the constitution of the transition.
138
 
 
The armed conflict that rocked Ivory Coast in 2007 led to the signing of the 
Ouagadougou Political Agreement between the Presidency of Cote d'ivoire and the 
Forces Nouvelles of Cote d'ivoire which stipulated for amnesty as follows:  
"In order to facilitate pardon and national reconciliation and to 
restore social cohesion and solidarity among the Ivorians, the two 
Parties of the Direct Dialogue agree to extend the scope of the 
amnesty law adopted in 2003."  
 
"To this effect, they have decided to adopt, by way of an ordinance, a 
new amnesty law covering the crimes and offences relating to attacks 
on the security of the State linked to the disturbances which have 
shaken Cote d'ivoire and were committed between 17 September 
2000 and the date of entry into force of the present agreement, with 
the exception of economic crimes, war crimes and crimes against 
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humanity.
139
  
 
From the preceding examples, it can be concluded that although parties to armed 
conflicts signed various agreements which granted amnesty to persons who 
participated in the conflicts, two conclusions are drawn: (i) some agreements 
provided for total amnesty and; (2) some agreements only recognized limited 
amnesty, excluding amnesty for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
as demonstrated by agreements signed in Ivory Coast and the DRC quoted above. 
This already signals that amnesty cannot be accepted in certain serious international 
crimes.  
 
Even if international criminal law seems to impose obligations on states to prosecute 
persons responsible for international crimes, it can still be argued that this branch of 
law does not outlaw amnesty in its entirety. There are certain circumstances whereby 
amnesty could be accepted, albeit indirectly or explicitly in certain treaties. For 
example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court can be said to have 
impliedly accepted the existence of amnesty.  
 
4.2.2 Amnesty in National Laws, Judicial Decisions and State Practice  
Apart from treaties and agreements, amnesty is also a matter which is largely 
reflected in national laws and state practice.
140
 Particularly in states arising from 
non-international armed conflicts. The purpose of granting amnesty is to seek 
reconciliation, peace and unity. Here, this part examines some notable examples on 
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how amnesty has been accepted in a number of states. Various Military Manuals 
have been codified in certain countries and have replicated the contents of Article 
6(5) of Additional Protocol II on the recognition of amnesty.  
 
In Canada, the Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and 
Tactical Levels provides clearly that '[a]t the end of hostilities, and in order to 
facilitate a return to peaceful conditions, the authorities in power are to endeavour to 
grant the broadest possible amnesty to those who have participated in the conflict, or 
been deprived of their liberty for reasons related thereto, whether they are interned 
or detained’.141 This is relatively similar position found in the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland's Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict, 2004,
142
 
and those in New Zealand
143
 and the Netherlands.
144
  
 
Amnesty has widely been used in laws of most states in the world, particularly in 
Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa. The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) has documented certain notable examples
145
 here that would help 
demonstrate this assertion, and accordingly, this contribution acknowledges the 
information found on the website of the ICRC. In 1973, Argentina enacted an 
amnesty law which provided that, 'amnesty shall be granted for acts committed 
before 25 May 1973 and relating to political, social, trade union or student activities, 
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and for acts committed by civilians prosecuted by military courts or military 
commanders. Under this law, all sentences for such acts should be discontinued’.146 
This law was followed by the Self- Amnesty Law of 1983 relating to armed conflicts 
and all actions done to stop subversive or terrorist activities.
147
 The 1983 law was 
found to be unconstitutional and declared void by the Law Repealing the Self-
Amnesty Law in the same year.
148
 In Chile, the then military government under 
General Augusto Pinochet enacted the Decree-Law on General Amnesty. Under this 
law, amnesty was to apply in the following category of persons:  
"[A] II persons who have been the authors, accomplices, or 
accessories of unlawful deeds during the period in which the state of 
siege was in force, between 11 September 1973 and 10 March 1978, 
unless they are currently being tried or have been sentenced and to 
those persons who as of the date that this decree-law took effect have 
been sentenced by military tribunals since 11 September 1973.”149  
 
In Colombia, the Amnesty Decree enacted in 1991 provided that amnesty or pardon 
could be granted to members of the guerilla groups who demonstrated the need to 
reintegrate into civilian life.
150
 This certainly imposed conditions for granting for 
people to benefit from amnesty. In EI Salvador, the General Amnesty Law for 
Consolidated Peace which was enacted in 1993 provided for full, absolute and 
unconditional amnesty to all persons who had participated in the commission of 
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political crimes and related crimes committed before January 1992.
151
 This law 
defined political crimes to include crimes against the public peace. Article 4 of this 
law provided that amnesty extinguishes all civil liability. Similar laws were enacted 
in Guatemala and Peru.  
 
In 1996 Guatemala enacted the National Reconciliation Law which accepted 
amnesty for political crimes. It warranted amnesty in the following manner: 'total 
release from penal responsibility for political crimes committed during the armed 
internal confrontation' and 'the total release from penal responsibility for common 
crimes. connected to' such political crimes.
152
 However, Article 8 of this law rejected 
amnesty for genocide, torture, forced disappearance, and to all crimes which statutes 
of limitations do not apply, and according to internal and international treaties 
ratified by Guatemala, do not allow exception from penal responsibility.  
 
In South Africa, perpetrators of the crime of apartheid benefited from amnesty as a 
result of the enactment of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
of 1995. The Act, which among other things established the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, provides that one of the functions of the TRC is to:  
"facilitate and promote the granting of amnesty in respect of acts 
associated with political objectives, by receiving from persons desiring 
to make a full disclosure of all the relevant facts, applications for the 
granting of amnesty in respect of such acts, and transmitting such 
applications to the Committee on Amnesty for its decision, and by 
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publishing decisions granting amnesty, in the Gazette.”153  
 
To achieve that purpose, an Amnesty Committee
154
 was established composed of 
judges and senior lawyers. It considered applications for amnesty granted amnesty 
where it was satisfied that applicants had committed acts constituting gross 
violations of human rights and made full disclosure of all relevant facts about acts 
committed in relation to political goals in the course of conflicts of the past.
155
 To 
consider an act as constituting a political crime, the standard to be used is the same 
as the one under extradition law. Persons who failed to be granted amnesty or those 
who failed to apply for amnesty were to be prosecuted. However, section 20 (7) 
provides that:  
(a) "No person who has been granted amnesty in respect of an act,  
omission or offence shall be criminally or civilly liable in 
respect of such act, omission or offence and no body or 
organization or the state shall be liable, and no person shall be 
vicariously liable for any such act, omission or offence."  
(b) "Where amnesty is granted to any person in respect of any act,  
omission or offence, such amnesty shall have no influence upon 
the criminal liability of any other person contingent upon the 
liability of the first mentioned person."  
The cumulative effect of these provisions is that once a person has been granted 
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amnesty cannot be prosecuted, nor can he be held civilly liable for any act, omission 
or offence subject of amnesty. Of those prosecuted, only a handful of them involved 
high profile state officials, the rest being ordinary citizens.
156
 A case was instituted 
challenging section 20 (7) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act 34 of 1995 in that it affected the right of victims of apartheid crimes to seek 
court remedy as provided for under the constitution and international law. The 
Constitutional Court, after examining article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II and the 
Preamble to the Constitution, read together with the purposes of the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act, held that section 20(7) was constitutional and 
did not violate international law because even article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II 
allows states to grant amnesty at the end of hostilities.
157
  
 
The Ugandan court also took the same decision on the constitutionality of amnesty 
granted to rebels belonging to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). This, the court 
said in a landmark case of Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni vs Uganda.
158
 The court 
had been called to interpret the Amnesty Act, 2000
159
 in light of the Constitution of 
Uganda, 1995. Briefly, section 3 of the Amnesty Act provides as follows:  
(1) An Amnesty is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at 
any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is 
engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the 
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Republic of Uganda by-  
(a) Actual participation in combat;  
(b) Collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion;  
(c) Committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed 
rebellion;  
or  
(d) Assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed 
rebellion.  
(2) A person referred to under subsection (1) shall not be prosecuted 
or subjected to any form of punishment for the participation in the 
war or rebellion for any crime committed in the cause of the war 
or armed rebellion.  
 
Certain conditions are stipulated under the Amnesty Act before one can benefit 
from amnesty provision. Such conditions are found in section 3 which states that a 
reporter shall be taken to be granted amnesty declared under section 2 if the reporter 
(a) reports to the nearest army or police unit, a chief, a member of the executive 
committee of the local government, a magistrate or religious leader within the 
locality, (b) renounces and abandons involvement in the war or armed rebellion, (c) 
surrenders at any such place or to any such authority or person any weapons in his 
or her possession and, (d) is issued with a certificate of amnesty. Thomas Kwoyelo 
was arrested together with his fellow rebels of LRA, and they were detained at 
Upper Prison, Luzira where he made a declaration renouncing a rebellion and 
sought amnesty. His declaration was submitted to the Amnesty Commission for 
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consideration under the Amnesty Act.  
 
On 19 March 2010 the Commission forwarded Kwoyelo's application to the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for considerations as per the Amnesty Act. 
The Commission stated that it considered Kwoyelo as one who qualified to benefit 
from the amnesty process. Despite the recommendation by the Amnesty 
Commission, the DPP preferred to charge Kwoyelo before the court with offences 
specified under the Geneva Convention IV  Act.  Kwoyelo was to be prosecuted 
before the War Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda. He filed an 
application to the Constitutional Court challenging the decision of the DPP not to 
grant him a certificate of amnesty and that his prosecution was based on 
discrimination, contrary to the constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled that 
Kwoyelo was entitled to benefit from amnesty from prosecution.
160
  
 
From the above, it is appropriate to conclude that amnesty is still recognised in 
international law based on treaties and agreements, and domestic laws, despite all 
treaties outlawing it. Dugard observed that,  
"The present state of international on the issue of amnesty is, to put it 
mildly, unsettled. While amnesty is prohibited in the case of genocide 
and war crimes committed in international armed conflicts, there are 
no clear rules prohibiting amnesty in the case of other international 
crimes. This uncertainty has a major advantage: it allows 
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prosecutions to proceed where they will not impede peace, but at the 
same time permits societies to 'trade' amnesty for peace where there 
is no alternative.” 161 
 
Despite such conclusion, Dugard cautions that '[ulncondltional amnesty for 
atrocious crimes is, however, no longer generally accepted by the international 
community.’162 This makes it important to examine whether amnesty, however 
lawful it may be either in treaties or under national legislative frameworks, is 
compatible with the international law duty imposed on states to prosecute 
perpetrators of the most serious international crimes. To be able to answer this 
question, one must first establish whether there exist express obligations under 
treaties and customary international law.  
 
Once this is established, it would then require one to tackle the issue whether such 
obligations have attained the status of high norms to the extent that if weighed 
against the right to grant amnesty after hostilities, it should prevail, and if so, under 
which circumstances and legal bases. The discussion on these identified issues 
follows below.  
 
4.2.3 Is Amnesty Compatible with Modern International Law Obligations?  
As discussed in Chapter 2 above, states have obligations to prosecute perpetrators of 
international crimes (see part 2.4 in chapter 2 above). Hence, should states fail to 
prosecute then they could be held liable for an internationally wrongful act entailing 
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state responsibility.
163
  
 
Contemporary international law as found in decided cases, treaties and state practice 
also reflects that amnesty cannot prevail over the state obligations to prosecute and 
punish persons responsible for serious international crimes. This part demonstrates 
how international law has outlawed and rejected amnesty. This discussion here is 
centred on national judicial pronouncements, statutes of international courts, and the 
approach taken by the ICRC.. Restrictions have been imposed on amnesty in respect 
of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  
 
Many states have legislated against amnesty in their domestic laws. For example, the 
Military Manual of the Netherlands stipulates that amnesty granted to any suspect of 
war crimes by his own government shall not prevent his prosecution by other 
states.
164
 Similar position is observed in New Zealand
165
 and the United Kingdom.
166
 
The UK Manual clearly specifies that article 6(5} of Additional Protocol II does not 
apply to persons responsible for crimes under international law. In Argentina, Article 
184 of the Draft Code of Military Justice, 1998, provides that '[i]n no case shall 
amnesty or pardon be granted with respect to the offences contained in Chapter I 
(offences against protected persons and objects in the event of armed conflict.' Also, 
as already observed in the laws from ORC, Guatemala, Uruguay and Ivory Coast 
(discussed above), amnesty does not apply to war crimes, genocide and crimes 
                                                 
163 Ken Obura, Duty to Prosecute International Crimes under International Law' in Murungu, C and 
Biegon, J (2011) Prosecuting International Crimes in A/rica, Pretoria University Law Press: 
Pretoria, Ch.1, 1-31. 
164
 Netherlands, Military Manual on Armed Conflict, 2005, 1166. 
165
 Military Manual, 1992, para 1816. 
166
 Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 2004, para 15.42. 
  
67 
against humanity. Similarly, section 28(1) of the Constitution of Ethiopia, 1995 does 
not recognise amnesty for crimes against humanity. Article 15(6) of the Law of Iraqi 
Supreme Tribunal rejects amnesty. In Rwanda, Article 31 of the Law on the 
Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, 1996 rejects 
amnesty: '[t]he court having jurisdiction over the civil action shall rule on damages 
even where the accused ... has benefited from an amnesty.'  
 
In Sierra Leone, amnesty granted to the RUF/SL rebels by article IX of the Lome 
Agreement of 1999 was challenged by the Special Court for Sierra Leone when it 
interpreted Article 10 of its Statute which provides that:  
"An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction 
of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 
2 to 4 of the present Statute [crimes against humanity, violations 
of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 
1977 Additional Protocol II, and other serious violations of IHL] 
shall not be a bar to prosecution."  
 
The above provision was' put to test in the cases of Prosecutor vs Kallon and 
Kamara
167
and Prosecutor vs Gbao
168
 whereby the' court clarified that amnesty dos 
not bar prosecution of persons responsible for international crimes before 
international courts, and that amnesty cannot bar prosecution of persons before 
foreign national courts exercising universal jurisdiction over serious international 
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crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Similarly, the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia cannot recognise amnesty for 
serious international crimes because the law establish the Chambers provides that 
'[t]he Royal Government of Cambodia shall not request an amnesty or pardon for 
any persons who may be investigated for or convicted of crimes referred to in the 
present Agreement
169
. Article 6 of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
also rejects amnesty for international crimes, including terrorism.
170
  
 
Decided cases from various countries have also outlawed amnesty for international 
crimes. Contrary to the decisions in South Africa and Uganda (discussed above), 
courts in Argentina, Chile, France, and Ethiopia have decided that amnesty cannot 
be granted for international crimes suspects. In Argentina, a court nullified two 
amnesty laws enacted in 1987 as these laws were found to violate international law 
duty to investigate and punish persons responsible for international crimes.
171
 
Similarly, in Chile, the Supreme Court of Chile ruled on the Saavedra case in the 
judgment of 19 November 1993 that amnesty could not apply, and consequently, 
considered the amnesty laws of 1978 invalid. In 1994, the same court ruled again 
regarding torture, abduction and murder as constituting grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions where amnesty cannot apply. The court held that:  
"Such offences as constitute grave breaches of the Convention 
are ... unamenable to amnesty; ... [it is not] appropriate to apply 
amnesty as a way of extinguishing criminal liability."  
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"Any attempt by a State to tamper with the criminality of and 
consequent liability for acts which infringe the laws of war and 
the rights of persons in wartime is beyond the State's competence 
while it is a Party to the Geneva Conventions on humanitarian 
law
172
. 
 
When Mengistu Haile Mariam was tried in Ethiopia, the Special Prosecutor argued 
in 1995 that 'it is ... a well established custom and belief that war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are not subject to amnesty’, 173  Apart from the judicial decisions 
from national courts, international and regional courts established either to monitor 
human rights or to prosecute international crimes have also echoed clearly that 
amnesty cannot be accepted for international crimes as it is incompatible with the 
duty to prosecute perpetrators of crimes. Particularly, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has concluded that an amnesty constitutes violations 
of international law obligations. The Commission said this in its report on the 
situation in EI Salvador that:  
. "Regardless of any necessity that the peace negotiations might pose 
and irrespective of purely political considerations, the very sweeping 
General Amnesty Law [for Consolidation of Peace] passed by EI 
Salvador's Legislative Assembly constitutes a violation of the 
international obligations it undertook when it ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights, because it makes possible a reciprocal 
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amnesty" without first acknowledging responsibility because it applies to 
crimes against humanity, and because it eliminates any possibility of 
obtaining adequate pecuniary compensation, primarily for victims.”174  
 
Later, in 1999 the same Commission decided against the General Amnesty Laws in 
EI Salvador. It clearly stated that:  
"In approving and enforcing the General Amnesty Law, the Salvadoran 
State violated the right to judicial guarantees enshrined in Article 8(1) of 
the [1969 American Convention on Human Rights], to the detriment of the 
surviving victims of torture and of the relatives of ... who were prevented 
from obtaining redress in the civil courts; all of this in relation to Article 
1(1) of the Convention ... In promulgating and enforcing the Amnesty Law, 
EI Salvador has violated the right to judicial protection enshrined in Article 
25 of the [1969 American Convention on Human Rights], to the detriment 
of the surviving victims and those with legal claims on behalf of...”175 
 
Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decided in 2001 in the Barrios 
Altos case, declared the amnesty laws enacted by Peruvian government to be illegal 
and contrary to international law as follows:  
"This Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on 
prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate 
responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent 
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the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious 
human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of them prohibited 
because they violate non-derogable rights recognized by 
international human rights law .....”176  
 
In Africa, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has decided that 
amnesties for serious human rights violations are incompatible with the duty of 
states to prosecute and punish these violations.
177
 On its part, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee which is responsible to oversee implementation of civil 
and political rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
was concerned by the Decree number 114 of 11 June 2006 granting general amnesty 
in Sudan. The Committee recommended that Sudan should ensure that no amnesty 
is granted to anyone believed to be responsible for serious crimes.
178
 In its General 
Comment NO.31 stressed the need to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes 
and rejected amnesty. 
179
 
 
It seems now that, truly, amnesty violates international obligations imposed on 
states to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. This view is shared by the 
ICRC which argued back in 1995 regarding article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II 
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that 'this provision could not be invoked in favour of impunity of war criminals, 
since it only applied to prosecution for the sole participation in hostilities
180
. In 1997 
the ICRC clarified further article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II did not aim at 
amnesty for those violating international humanitarian law.
181
 The Trial Chamber of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that torture is 
prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law which serves to de-Iegitimise 
any legislative or judicial act authorising torture
182
. This is essentially based on jus 
cogens prohibiting torture. Hence, it is prohibited by international law jus cogens not 
to adopted amnesty measures thereby violating international law.  
 
4.2.4 Conclusion  
It is now apt to conclude that amnesty cannot prevail over prosecution particularly 
where international crimes are involved. This conclusion is based on the established 
jurisprudence, national laws, treaties and statutes of international courts which 
expressly reject amnesty. The current trend in the world suggests that even in those 
states where amnesty laws were enacted, subsequent changes have occurred thereby 
nullifying such amnesty laws. Although a few landmark cases exists in Uganda and 
South Africa upholding amnesty, such are unfortunate decisions that tend to ignore 
the duty imposed states to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. The 
decisions in the AZAPO case in South Africa and Kwoyelo in Uganda, indeed, 
detracts from the progressive move towards impunity free world for serious 
international crimes. It must be recalled that international treaties outlawing 
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international crimes have attained a jus cogens status thereby creating ergo omnes 
obligations to all states in the world.  
 
The fact that some of the national courts, such as those in Ethiopia, have decided 
against amnesty, signals that there is no consensus at national level whether 
amnesty should be allowed to prevail even for international crimes.  
 
To the contrary, in international judicial and treaty practices, it is clear that amnesty 
cannot prevail and does not bar criminal prosecutions of perpetrators of serious 
crimes under international law. It is argued here that amnesty, in fact, encourages 
more crimes to be committed than bringing the intended peace and reconciliation. 
Amnesty sets a bad precedent particularly to members of the rebel forces or armed 
forces of states that they might commit crimes and walk scot-free. Amnesty should 
be discouraged at all times, so that national and international courts can be given 
opportunities to exercise their jurisdictions over persons responsible for 
international crimes. Further, because the duty to prosecute international crimes has 
attained jus cogens status, such higher norms cannot be subservient to the lower 
exception as amnesty. Prosecution should be viewed as a rule and amnesty as an 
exception.  
 
Amnesty does not really become beneficial to the victims of serious international 
crimes. It only serves a few individuals mostly in the ruling class and in the armed 
forces. Prosecution can prove effective because of its deterrent role and the need to 
bring happiness to the victims of crimes, a sort of satisfaction. This study prefers 
prosecution to amnesty because amnesty can be granted to perpetrators at the 
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expense of the victims of crimes. A particular example is Sierra Leone where rebels 
were granted amnesty, yet victims could not even be paid reparations. Equally, even 
in South Africa, victims have not been happy with the amnesty granted to the 
perpetrators of apartheid.  So, in view of this, amnesty only seems to favour those in 
power but does not accommodate victims of crimes.  Therefore, let prosecution 
reign over amnesty.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
5.1 Findings 
5.2 Decided Cases Reveal that International Courts do not Recognize Amnesty  
Findings show that, decisions of international and national courts support the 
position that the duty to prosecute and punish international crimes is part of 
customary international law. The dissenting judgment in the Lockerbie case at the 
ICJ, Judge Weeramantry asserted that the duty to prosecute or extradite international 
crimes constitutes a well-established principle of customary law. 
 
 In Prosecutor v Gbao, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
stated that 'under international law, states are under a duty to prosecute crimes 
whose prohibition has the status of jus cogens
183
.  The fact that some of the national 
courts, such as those in Ethiopia in Special Prosecutor  v Haile Mengistu Mariam 
have decided against amnesty, signal that there is no consensus at national level 
whether amnesty should be allowed to prevail even for international crimes. To the 
contrary, in international judicial and treaty practices, it is clear that amnesty cannot 
prevail and does not bar criminal prosecutions of perpetrators of serious crimes 
under international law.  
 
The current trend in the world suggests that even in those states where amnesty laws 
were enacted, subsequent changes have occurred thereby nullifying such amnesty 
laws. Although a few landmark cases exist in Uganda and South Africa upholding 
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amnesty, such are unfortunate decisions that tend to ignore the duty imposed states 
to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. The decisions in AZAPO case in 
South Africa and Kwoyelo in Uganda, indeed, detracts from the progressive move 
towards impunity free world for serious international crimes. It must be recalled that 
international treaties outlawing international crimes have attained a jus cogens 
status thereby creating erga omnes obligations to all states to prosecute international 
crimes.  
 
5.2.1 Challenges of Amnesty Laws in Different African National Courts  
Chapter Three of this study has examined the existing laws, judicial precedents and 
state practice on amnesty and prosecution of international crimes whereby in Africa 
a good case study is presented by South Africa, Sierra Leone and Uganda. In all 
these states, it is observed that international crimes are punishable by law in one 
side, while in the other side, still presents an interesting case study on recent 
amnesties which have been granted to perpetrators of international crimes, hence 
challenged before the courts.  
 
The fact that some of the national courts, such as those in Ethiopia, have decided 
against amnesty signals that there is no consensus at national levels whether 
amnesty should be allowed to prevail, even for international crimes. To the contrary, 
in respect of international judicial and treaty practices, it is clear that amnesty cannot 
prevail and does not bar criminal prosecutions of perpetrators of serious crimes 
under international law. On the other side, the experience from Latin America shows 
that between 1970s and 1980s amnesty laws were issued by Argentina, Uruguay, EI 
Salvador, and Chile were considered by the Inter-American Commission. In all the 
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cases the Commission found them in violation of the Inter- American Convention. 
184
 
 
5.2.1.1The African Union and the Accusations of Bias on the ICC  
An observation is made that since it came into operation in July 2002, the ICC has 
only prosecuted individuals accused for international crimes from Africa, leaving 
individuals from other parts of the world free. This has led to the creation of the 
negative attitudes on African side. The African Union (AU) opposes the ICC 
prosecutions on the grounds that the ICC reflects imperialism, selective justice for 
targeting only Africans, and that the ICC has acted with double standards. For 
example, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, a country which is not a party to the 
Court, has portrayed the ICC as a form of "Imperialism" that seeks to "undermine 
people from poor and African countries and other powerless countries in terms of 
economic development and politics.
185
  
 
The attempt to prosecute AI Bashir has been particularly controversial, drawing 
rebuke from African governments and regional organizations. Jean Ping, the then 
President of the AU Commission, has accused the ICC of hypocrisy, contending 
that "we are not against the ICC, but there are two systems of measurement ... the 
ICC seems to exist solely for judging Africans".
186
 A recent decision of the AU 
Assembly of Heads of State and Governments echoes that African states prefer 
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withdrawal from the Rome Statute.  
 
The AU seems to favour domestic and African  centered  means of resolving 
conflicts in Africa, including peaceful means such as amnesty and reconciliation 
even where international crimes have been committed in Kenya, Libya and Sudan. 
Furthermore, it should be well understood that customary international law imposes 
obligation on states to prosecute and punish international crimes. This also extends 
to issues of cooperation with judicial institutions established to punish international 
crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture and the crime 
of aggression. Thus in this respect the calls for non-cooperation with the ICC in 
prosecution of International crimes does not only violate customary international 
law but also by doing so the AU has acted in violation of the provisions of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU which reject impunity and outlaw genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.
187
 
 
5.3 Recommendations  
From the preceding findings, this study presents a number of recommendations as 
indicated hereunder. Recommendations are directed at international, the African 
Union, national courts and specific African states.  
 
Genocide Convention, Convention Against Torture and Geneva Conventions 
applicable in armed conflicts. The duty to prosecute perpetrators of serious 
international crimes should only be fully observed by allowing States to use 
universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of serious crimes. This obligation clearly 
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outweighs amnesty recognized under Article 6(5) of the Additional Protocol  I  to 
the Geneva Conventions, 1977.  
 
5.3.4 African States Should Enact Laws to Repress Serious International 
Crimes  
The duty to prosecute serious international crimes entails that states must adopt 
legislative measures to enable courts to prosecute and punish perpetrators of serious 
international crimes. To enable domestic courts to repress serious international 
crimes, states should adopt laws that proscribe international crimes and outlaw 
amnesty for serious international crimes. In this regard, it is recommended that the 
existing amnesty laws such as those in Uganda and South Africa, should be repealed 
and should not expressly grant blanket or conditional amnesty to members of the 
rebel groups operating in African states.  
 
5.3.5 Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II, 1977 Should be Amended  
It is clear that any attempt to justify amnesty in international law finds its basis in 
Article 6(5) of the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, 1977. This 
provision tends to recognise broad amnesty in the context of parties to armed 
conflicts. This in the end has an impact of going contrary to all provisions found in 
the Geneva Conventions (I -IV) of 1949 that require states to repress grave breaches 
and serious violations of international humanitarian law. Contracting parties to the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, in collaboration with the ICRC 
should undertake concerted efforts to reconcile the conflict between the duty to 
prosecute recognised under the Geneva Conventions and an amnesty provision 
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(Article 6(5)) in the Additional Protocol II.   
 
5.4 Conclusions 
The conclusions of this study as presented here below confirm the hypothesis that 
International law jus cogens imposes obligations to prosecute and punish 
perpetrators of international crimes. There are international law jus cogens (a 
system of higher norms to which no derogation is permitted) imposing obligation 
erga  omnes  to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. Chapter Two of this 
study has shown that international law jus cogens imposes obligations  erga omnes 
in relation to international crimes over amnesty granted by national courts to 
perpetrators of international crimes. Arguments are also presented that jus cogens 
crimes create an erga  omnes obligations for states to apply universal jurisdiction to 
prosecute international crimes, although amnesties may sometimes prevent national 
courts from exercising jurisdiction over perpetrators of international crimes.  
 
This is evident in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia in Furundzija case
188
;  
"It would be senseless to argue, on the one hand, that on account of the 
jus cogens value of the prohibition against torture, treaties or 
customary rules providing for torture would be null and void ab 
initio, and then by unmindful of a State say, taking national 
authorizing or condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators 
through amnesty law".  
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